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Interpreting retained EU private law post-Brexit: Can Commonwealth comparisons 
help us determine the future relevance of CJEU case-law? 
Paula Giliker*  
Abstract: In June 2016, the UK voted in a referendum to leave the European Union.  The consequences of Brexit 
are wide-ranging, but, from a legal perspective, it will entail the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972.  
The UK government does not intend to repeal EU law which is in existence on exit day, but, in terms of the 
interpretation of retained law, decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will no longer be 
binding after Brexit (subject to any agreed transition period).  Nevertheless, section 6(2) of the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 does allow the UK courts to continue to pay regard to EU law and decisions of the CJEU 
“so far as it is relevant to any matter before the court”.  This paper will consider the meaning of the phrase “may 
have regard to anything … so far as it is relevant”.   In empowering the courts to consider post-Brexit CJEU 
authority subject to the undefined criterion of relevancy, to what extent is this power likely to be exercised?  A 
comparison will be drawn with the treatment of Privy Council and the UK case-law in Commonwealth courts 
following the abolition of the right of appeal to the Privy Council, with particular reference to the example of 
Australia. It will be argued that guidance may be obtained from the common law legal family which can help us 
determine the future relevance of CJEU case-law in the interpretation of retained EU private law. 
 
1. Introduction  
On 23rd June 2016, 51.9% of voters in the United Kingdom voted for the UK to leave the 
European Union after 43 years of membership.1 In March 2017, the European Union 
(Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 permitted the UK Prime Minister to notify, under Art 
50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU.  Art 50(3) 
provides for termination of EU membership “from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal 
agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification.”2  The Prime Minister notified the 
Council of the UK’s intention to leave the EU on 29 March 2017.3  The European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018, which received Royal Assent on 26 June 2018, provides that the 
European Communities Act 1972 will be repealed on exit day.4  Subject then to any agreed 
transition or implementation period, ultimately sections 2(4) and 3(1) of  the 1972 Act, which 
give effect to the doctrine of the supremacy of EU law over national law, will be repealed.5  
While the Act provides that EU-derived domestic legislation (e.g. that implementing EU 
Directives) which is in effect in domestic law immediately before exit day will continue to have 
effect on and after exit day,6  and that direct EU legislation (e.g. Regulations) will form part of 
                                                          
* Professor of Comparative Law, University of Bristol.  This paper was delivered at the Obligations IX conference 
co-hosted by the Universities of Melbourne and Oxford and the author is grateful to James Lee, Sirko Harder, 
Joshua Getzler and the anonymous reviewers of the Common Law World Review for their helpful comments.  Any 
errors are those of the author alone. 
1 The United Kingdom officially joined the then European Economic Community on 1 January 1973. 
2 Provision is made, however, for the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, to 
unanimously decide to extend this period. 
3 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604079/Prime
_Ministers_letter_to_European_Council_President_Donald_Tusk.pdf (accessed 12 November 2018). 
4 s.1. Sched.1, para 4 also provides that State liability for breach of EU law under Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 
Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357 will no longer apply on or after exit day. 
5 Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L [1964] ECR 1141; KJ Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The 
Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (OUP, 2003); A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of 
Europe (OUP, 2004). 
6 s. 2(1). EU-derived domestic legislation is defined at s.2(2).  
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domestic law on and after exit day,7  it will be the UK court system alone which will interpret 
the retained EU case law.8  
 
This paper will examine the implications of these momentous political developments for 
English private law.9  While matters such as free movement of goods and people and issues 
regarding the UK’s external relations may be the most obvious issues arising from leaving of 
the European Union,10  European Union law has also had an important impact on private law.11  
Twigg-Flesner has highlighted the great diversity of instruments which have changed national 
contract law, be it commercial or consumer law.12  The Consumer Rights Directive 
2011/83/EU,13 for example, provides a single set of core rules for distance and off-premises 
contracts, strengthens consumer protection by introducing stricter pre-contractual information 
requirements and a uniform right of withdrawal period, and offers targeted protection on 
specific issues e.g. retailers are no longer permitted to charge more than actual costs for use of 
credit cards or any other method of payment, or hotlines. The Directive, implemented by both 
primary and secondary legislation,14 reflects the dual purposes of EU consumer law: to achieve 
a high level of consumer protection across the EU and to contribute to the proper functioning 
of the internal market.15  The same, to a lesser extent, may be said for the law of tort.16  The 
Product Liability Directive 1985/374/EEC,17 for example, implemented by Part 1 of the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987, is ambitious in imposing strict liability on manufacturers for 
                                                          
7 s. 3(1). 
8 “Retained EU case law” means any principles laid down by, and any decisions of, the European Court of Justice 
as they have effect in EU law immediately before exit day (subject to other provisions of the Act): s.6(7). The 
duty of consistent interpretation (that domestic law must be interpreted, as far as possible, in accordance with EU 
law) will be maintained, however, in respect of pre-exit domestic legislation: s.6(3). 
9 For reasons of space, the article will focus on contract and tort law and will not examine unjust enrichment, 
although EU law has had some impact here, notably in relation to overpaid tax and VAT: see R Williams, Unjust 
Enrichment and Public Law: A Comparative Study of England, France and the EU (Hart Publishing, 2010); S 
Elliott, B Häcker and C Mitchell (eds), Restitution of Overpaid Tax (Hart Publishing, 2013) ch 1. 
10 See, for example, M. Dougan (ed), The UK after Brexit: Legal and Policy Challenges (Intersentia, 2017); F. 
Fabbrini (ed), The Law & Politics of Brexit (OUP, 2017); A. Biondi, P.J. Birkinshaw and M. Kendrick, Brexit: 
The Legal Implications (Wolters Kluwer, 2018) and special editions of journals including (2016) 27(3) King’s 
Law Journal: ‘Brexit means Brexit: but what does Brexit mean?’. 
11 See, for example, J. Devenney and M. Kenny (eds), The Transformation of European Private Law: 
Harmonisation, Consolidation, Codification or Chaos? (CUP, 2013); C. Twigg-Flesner (ed), The Cambridge 
Companion to European Union Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
12 C. Twigg-Flesner (ed), Research Handbook on EU Consumer and Contract Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2016); C. Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law (2nd ed., Routledge, 2015). 
13 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, 
OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64–88. 
14 Transposed into UK law by the Payment Surcharges Regulations SI 2012/3110, Consumer Contracts 
Regulations (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations SI 2013/3134, and Consumer Rights 
Act 2015. 
15 H. Schulte-Nolke and L. Tichy (eds), Perspectives for European Consumer Law: Towards a Directive 
on Consumer Rights and Beyond (Sellier, 2009); E. Hall, G. Howells and J. Watson, ‘The Consumer Rights 
Directive - an assessment of its contribution to the development of European consumer contract law’ (2012) 8 
E.R.C.L. 139-166. 
16 P. Giliker (ed), Research Handbook on EU Tort Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017); C. van Dam, European 
Tort Law (2nd ed., OUP, 2013), C. von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts vols 1 and 2 (OUP, 1998 and 
2000); M. Bussani, M. Infantino and F. Werro, ‘The common core sound: short notes on themes, harmonies and 
disharmonies in European tort law’ (2009) 20 K.L.J. 239. 
17 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products OJ L 210, 7.8.1985, pp. 29–33. 
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defective products which ensures (at least in theory) a uniform level of consumer protection 
across the European Union.18   
 
The EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 provides that these sources will remain part of UK law, but 
without any future binding interpretative guidance from the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU).  A court may still have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the 
European Court, another EU entity or the EU but only so far as it is relevant to any matter 
before the court.19  Section 6 of the 2018 Act makes this clear: 
 
(1) A court or tribunal— (a) is not bound by any principles laid down, or any decisions made, on or after 
exit day by the European Court, and (b) cannot refer any matter to the European Court on or after exit 
day.  
(2) Subject to this and subsections (3) to (6), a court or tribunal may have regard to anything done on or after 
exit day by the European Court, another EU entity or the EU so far as it is relevant to any matter before 
the court or tribunal. 
(3) Any question as to the validity, meaning or effect of any retained EU law is to be decided, so far as that 
law is unmodified on or after exit day and so far as they are relevant to it— (a) in accordance with any 
retained case law and any retained general principles of EU law, and (b) having regard (among other 
things) to the limits, immediately before exit day, of EU competences.20 
 
The Explanatory Notes to the Act merely repeat that while a court may have regard to post-exit 
CJEU decisions, it cannot have regard to such an extent it considers itself bound by them.21 
The Government anticipates that changes will be made to retained EU law by Parliament and 
the Supreme Court22 as and when deemed appropriate.  
 
The ambiguous wording of s.6(2) leaves open the question when reference to post-exit EU law 
and, more specifically, decisions of the CJEU will be deemed “relevant” by the UK courts.23   
Where legislation or case-law is based on EU sources (directives, regulations etc), will the UK 
courts continue to refer to future decisions of the CJEU as a specialist court dealing with EU 
law?  If so, how persuasive will any such decisions be to the future shaping of UK law?  As 
seen above, UK contract, tort, and specifically consumer law have been subject to a number of 
legislative instruments since 1973 which will be retained after Brexit.  What factors, then, will 
determine the relevance and persuasiveness of these sources?  
 
To answer this question, this paper will engage in a comparison with the practice of 
Commonwealth courts following the decision to end the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council (JCPC).  While this renders the case-law of the JCPC solely of persuasive 
                                                          
18 See D. Fairgrieve and R.S. Goldberg, Product Liability (3rd ed., OUP, 2018); S. Whittaker,  
Liability for Products: English Law, French Law, and European Harmonization (OUP, 2005); D. Fairgrieve and 
G. Howells, ‘Rethinking product liability: a missing element in the European Commission's third review of the 
Product Liability Directive’ (2007) 70 M.L.R. 962. 
19 s.6(5) adds that, in deciding whether to depart from any retained EU case law, the UK Supreme Court must 
apply the same test as it would apply in deciding whether to depart from its own case law. 
20 Emphasis added. s.6(6) provides that “Subsection (3) does not prevent the validity, meaning or effect of any 
retained EU law which has been modified on or after exit day from being decided as provided for in that subsection 
if doing so is consistent with the intention of the modifications.” 
21 Explanatory Notes to the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, paras 109-117. 
22 Ibid., para 113 which clarifies that after exit day, retained CJEU case law will have the same binding, or 
precedent, status in domestic courts and tribunals as existing decisions of the UKSC or the High Court of 
Justiciary. 
23 It is a matter over which senior judges have expressed concern, see C. Coleman, ‘UK judges need clarity about 
Brexit – Lord Neuberger’ BBC News 8 August 2017. Lord Neuberger was President of the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom from 2012 to 2017. 
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authority, as we shall see, common law jurisdictions have continued to make reference to such 
case-law to the present day.  What factors, then, determine the continuing relevance and 
persuasiveness of such sources?  For reasons of space I will focus primarily on one jurisdiction, 
Australia, although reference will be made to other jurisdictions.  This is chosen for three 
reasons.  First because the right to appeal to the Privy Council was abolished in 1986 (a period 
which gives time for reflection but is recent enough not to be dismissed as historically-dated).  
Secondly, it is a jurisdiction where the courts and judges have clearly articulated their approach 
to the use of persuasive authority and there is citation data analysing the approaches of the 
courts.  Thirdly, like the EU, it is a jurisdiction with which the UK has long-standing trading 
relations and historical ties, but involves a relationship not without its tensions, typified by the 
debate concerning the Australian flag.24  Examining the practice of the Australian courts does 
not provide an exact comparator to Brexit, but, in the face of uncertainty, it is submitted that a 
comparative study is capable of highlighting factors which are likely to determine to what 
extent the courts will continue to find CJEU case-law relevant and persuasive post-Brexit.   
 
 
2. Leaving the EU and abolishing the right of appeal to the JCPC – a valid 
comparison? 
 
This article is about departure and how a legal system should treat decisions of a court whose 
judgments were previously binding but, for political reasons, are now rendered solely of 
persuasive authority.  For Commonwealth States, parallels may be found with the decision to 
abolish the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC).  The reasons 
for departure from the JCPC have varied from the overtly political (notably a backlash against 
neo-colonialism and ‘White dominium’) to the practical.  Keith, for example, has argued that 
growing differences between Commonwealth States provided a significant reason for states to 
end the appeal to the JCPC.25  The reputation of the JCPC has also varied over time among 
professional and academic lawyers.26  Finn has commented that  “the real Achilles heel of the 
common law of England … was its parochialism”, in other words its narrow-minded pursuit of 
policies which paid little attention to the needs of individual States.27  The role of the JCPC 
(like the CJEU) is to produce uniformity across states, guiding other jurisdictions, as a 
specialist court, how to interpret the “common” law.  Established as the British Empire’s Court 
of Final Appeal in 1833 dealing with appeals from colonies from a mixture of legal traditions 
and different distributions of wealth and climates,28  it was never seen as a national court, but 
                                                          
24 See Guardian Australia, ‘Malcolm Turnbull says Australian flag will never change, rejecting new design’ 
January 26 2018. 
25 K.J. Keith, ‘The unity of the common law and the ending of appeals to the Privy Council’ (2005) 54 I.C.L.Q. 
197. 
26 G. Sawer, ‘Appeals to the Privy Council – Australia’ (1970) 2 Otago L Rev 138 at 144. For criticism of the 
ongoing right to appeal, see also B.J. Cameron, ‘Appeals to the Privy Council – New Zealand’ (1970) 2 Otago L 
Rev 138 at 172. 
27 P. Finn, ‘Unity, the divergence: The Privy Council, the common law of England and the common laws of 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand’ in A. Robertson and M. Tilbury (eds), The Common Law of Obligations: 
Divergence and Unity (Hart, 2016) 45.   
28 Judicial Committee Acts 1833 and 1844. Under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, the Law Lords became the 
permanent judges of the court.  Today, all Privy Counsellors who hold or have held high judicial office in the 
United Kingdom, or have been judges of superior courts of certain Commonwealth countries, are eligible to sit if 
they are under 75 years of age.  See, generally, Lord Neuberger, ‘The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
the 21st century’ (2014) 3 CJICL 30 and Lord Mance and J. Turner, Privy Council Practice (OUP, 2017).  The 
historical background to the Privy Council may be found in Mance and Turner at paras.1.05-1.32. 
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as the head of the judicial system of every British possession outside the United Kingdom.29 In 
the early part of the twentieth century, the JCPC was the highest appellate court for around a 
quarter of the world’s population (including Canada, Australia, New Zealand India and parts 
of Africa).30 This required, as Mitchell notes, “sophisticated and sensitive decisions”, needing 
both technical expertise and a belief in social solidarity.31 The Court’s relationship with other 
common law jurisdictions has also changed over time.  While at first, the unification of the 
common law was seen as important to the preservation of its integrity with the JCPC bringing 
into line diverging views,32 more recently the JCPC has accepted the need at times to defer to 
local knowledge and concerns. In a tort case of 1996, it notably held that “[t]he ability of the 
common law to adapt itself to the differing circumstances of the countries in which it has taken 
root, is not a weakness, but one of its great strengths. Were it not so, the common law would 
not have flourished as it has, with all the common law countries learning from each other.”33 
The JCPC’s earlier decision in Hart v O’Connor34 indicates, however, the delicate nature of 
this exercise.  In reversing a decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, it held that if that 
decision had been based on considerations peculiar to New Zealand, it would have been 
unlikely to intervene.  Where, however, the question related to a matter of general application 
throughout all jurisdictions based on the common law, intervention would be justified.   
Despite such developments, the overseas jurisdiction of the JCPC has declined since the 1940s 
as former dominions and colonies have decided to create their own top level courts rather than 
rely on the Judicial Committee. Today, a total of 27 Commonwealth countries, UK overseas 
territories and crown dependencies use the JCPC as their final court of appeal.35  Canada, for 
example, abolished the right of appeal to the JCPC in 1949;36 the Irish Free State in 1933.37 
For many of the newly independent members of the Commonwealth in Africa and the Indian 
subcontinent, the appeal ended soon after independence, although Malaysia and Singapore 
were later.  South Africa, for example, abolished the right to appeal in 1950.38 The decision to 
                                                          
29 Davison v Vickery's Motors [1925] HCA 47; 37 CLR 1 at 17 per Isaacs J. See Alexander E Hall & Co v 
Mackenna [1923] IR 402, 403-404 per Lord Haldane: “It is no more an English body than it is an Indian body, or 
a Canadian body … The Sovereign is everywhere throughout the Empire in the contemplation of the law”. See 
also Lord Neuberger in Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 44; [2016] 3 W.L.R. 534 at para.12. 
30 F. Safford and G. Wheeler, The Practice of the Privy Council in Judicial Matters (Sweet and Maxwell, 1901) 
vii. 
31 P. Mitchell, ‘The Privy Council and the difficulty of distance’ (2016) 36 O.J.L.S. 26, 28. Note also the revealing 
account of Viscount Haldane, ‘The work for the Empire of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’ (1921-
23) 1 C.L.J. 143, 148.  He argued at 154 that the “real work of the Committee is that of assisting in holding the 
Empire together”. 
32 See, for example, Victorian Railways Commissioners v Coultas (1888) 13 App. Cas. 222, 225-226, reversing 
decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria in which the JCPC was prepared to reject a claim for psychiatric injury 
on the basis that “learned counsel for the respondents was unable to produce any decision of the English Courts 
in which … damages were recovered”. 
33 Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] A.C. 624, 640 per Lord Lloyd. For Martin, Invercargill reflected 
real change in how the JCPC regarded its role: “it now seems that the Privy Council has adopted a postmodernist 
approach, recognising and valuing difference: R. Martin, ‘Diverging common law - Invercargill goes to the Privy 
Council’ (1997) 60 M.L.R. 94, 95. 
34 [1985] A.C. 1000, 1017 per Lord Brightman. See D. Capper, ‘The unconscionable bargain in the common law 
world’ (2010) 126 L.Q.R. 403.  
35 See https://www.jcpc.uk/about/index.html (accessed 12 November 2018).  
36 Criminal appeals to the Privy Council were ended in 1933. Civil appeals ended in 1949, when an amendment 
to the Supreme Court Act transferred ultimate appellant jurisdiction to Canada. The necessary legislative authority 
to do so had been conferred by the Statute of Westminster in 1931. 
37 The Constitution (Amendment no 22) Act 1933. 
38 Privy Council Appeals Act 1950 (SA), s1, amending the South Africa Act 1909 (RSA), s.106. 
 6 
 
abolish the right of appeal to the Privy Council signifies that the question of interpretation of 
domestic law based on English/UK/JCPC sources will in future be a matter for the national 
courts.   
Likewise, the courts of EU Member States are required to apply EU law and judgments of the 
CJEU, subject to review by the CJEU itself.39  While a court of referral rather than a final court 
of appeal in the common law sense, there is nevertheless an obligation on domestic courts from 
which there is no right of appeal to refer unresolved questions of interpretation of EU law to 
the CJEU.40 Failure to do so will risk liability in tort for breach of EU law.41  Nevertheless the 
CJEU does accept that at times deference must be made to the national courts.  EU law notably 
makes it clear that the CJEU must respect the Member States’ rights to administrative self-
organisation and to procedural autonomy subject to the general requirements of effectiveness 
and equivalence of remedies.42  Former CJEU judge Koen Lenaerts has noted therefore that 
the CJEU seeks to achieve a balance between the need to ensure the uniform application of EU 
law, whilst respecting the principle that remedies are to be provided by national legal systems.43   
The desire to respect local conditions has not, however, always worked well.  Tridimas has 
spoken, for example, of the Court exercising “selective deference”44; the CJEU opting at times 
for a more interventionist position which serves to remind national courts of its role as the 
authoritative interpreter of EU law.  This inevitably gives rise to tensions with the domestic 
courts and, indeed, at times, distrust.  One notable phenomenon in the relationship between 
national courts and the CJEU has been an apparent reluctance of national courts of final 
instance to make preliminary references under the art. 267 TFEU procedure.  In a number of 
controversial decisions, the national court has taken the view that the meaning of the legal 
provisions was in fact sufficiently clear, rejecting the request for a reference (the so-called acte 
clair doctrine).45  The Factortame litigation also highlights tension between the CJEU and 
national legislator; the European Court finding the UK Merchant Shipping Act 1988 to be 
contrary to EU law.46  Here, in addition to requiring the national court to override the exercise 
of sovereign legislative power by the UK Parliament,47 the UK government faced liability to 
pay damages to those individuals who had suffered loss as a consequence of the breach.48 
                                                          
39 See art 258 TFEU, art 259 TFEU and the preliminary reference procedure under art 267 TFEU. 
40 Article 267(3) TFEU.  See, generally, M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Preliminary References to the European 
Court of Justice (2nd edn, OUP, 2014). 
41 C-224/01, Köbler v Austria, ECLI:EU:C:2003:513.  See also C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA (In 
Liquidation) v Italy, ECLI:EU:C:2006:391 and Z. Varga, ‘National remedies in the case of violation of EU law 
by Member State courts’ (2017) 54 CML Rev 51. 
42 See P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6th edn, OUP 2015) 239-250.  
43 K. Lenaerts, ‘National remedies for private parties in the light of the EU law principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness’ [2011] Irish Jurist 13, 37. 
44 T. Tridimas, ‘Liability for breach of community law: Growing up and mellowing down?’ (2001) 38 CML Rev 
301. 
45 See CILFIT v Ministry of Health, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335. The UK Supreme Court infamously in Office of Fair 
Trading v Abbey National Plc [2009] UKSC 6; [2010] 1 AC 696 relied on the acte clair doctrine and refused to 
make an art 267 reference in circumstances where it disagreed with the interpretation of the law by four 
experienced judges in the courts below: see A. Arnull, ‘The Law Lords and the European Union: swimming with 
the incoming tide’ (2010) 36 EL Rev 57.  See more recently A. Limante, ‘Recent Developments in the acte 
clair case law of the EU Court of Justice: Towards a more Flexible Approach’ (2016) 54 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 1384. 
46 See, in particular, C-221/89 R. v Secretary of State for Transport Ex p. Factortame Ltd EU:C:1991:320, [1991] 
ECR I-3905; R. v Secretary of State for Transport Ex p. Factortame Ltd (No.2) [1991] 1 A.C. 603. See J. Hanlon, 
‘Factortame: Does Britannia still rule the waves?’ [1993] Denning L.J. 61. 
47 See P. Craig, ‘Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after Factortame’ (1991) 11 Y.E.L. 221; R. 
Thompson, ‘Community law and the limits of deference’ [2005] E.H.R.L.R. 243.  
48  R. v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex p. Factortame (No.5) [2000] 1 A.C. 524. 
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The above analysis highlights that similar questions arise when a jurisdiction leaves the 
jurisdiction of the JCPC and CJEU.  Both courts operate to supervise the correct application of 
the law (EU/common) in domestic legal systems with the aim of achieving a degree of 
uniformity.  This has led to tensions between the domestic and supranational courts.  While the 
supranational courts have tried to introduce some degree of deference in relation to local 
considerations, this has not operated consistently over time.  In both cases, fundamentally, we 
see departures – the UK from the CJEU and Commonwealth states from the Privy Council - 
with the inevitable question of how to treat decisions of the previously superior courts once 
departure has been secured.  This is not to claim that this is an exact analogy – the political 
context and legal framework is very different – but to highlight that there is enough in common 
for insights to be gained on a more generalised macro level.49 
 
 
3. Learning from Commonwealth comparisons: Practical examples and citation data 
 
As indicated above, the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 indicates that, in terms of precedent, future 
decisions of the CJEU will be regarded only as “persuasive authority”50 (or as Patrick Glenn 
put it “authority which attracts adherence as opposed to obliging it”).51  Reference may only 
be made when “relevant” and even if this test is satisfied, the Act does not indicate how 
persuasive CJEU authority will be (“may have regard”).  Authority tells us that persuasive 
authority may be viewed as convincing, distinguished or ignored; all we can say for definite is 
that it cannot compel a certain outcome.52  The situation in the UK will be compared, as stated 
in the introduction, with Australia due to the fact that the departure of Australia from the Privy 
Council is relatively recent (it abolished appeals partially in 1968 and 1975 and then completely 
in the Australia Act 1986).53 Finn has noted that the process of developing the common law to 
meet “their own needs and circumstances and to express their own values and aspirations” 
began in earnest in Canada in the late 1970s and in Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s.54   
Yet, as late as 1983, the Council of the New Zealand Law Society announced that it was 
unanimously opposed to the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council.55  It was only in the 
Supreme Court Act 2003 (NZ) that the right to appeal was ended, recognising that “New 
Zealand is an independent nation with its own history and traditions.”56  New Zealand, 
                                                          
49 On the differences between macro and micro-comparisons, see M. van Hoecke, ‘Methodology of comparative 
legal research’ (2015) Law and Method 1; J. Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law (Hart, 2015) 100-
104. 
50 See R. Bronaugh, ‘Persuasive precedent’ in L. Goldstein (ed), Precedent in Law (Clarendon Press, 1987); R. 
Cross and J.W. Harris, Precedent in English law (4th ed., Clarendon Press, 1999) 4-5. 
51 HP Glenn, ‘Persuasive authority’ (1987) 32 McGill L J 261, 263. 
52 Bronaugh (n 50) at 231. 
53 Australia Act 1986 (Cth), s.11.  Previous enactments had restricted the Committee’s appellate jurisdiction: Privy 
Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth), s.3 and Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 
(Cth), ss. 3 and 4. See Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 C.L.R. 88; Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 2) 
ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (1985) 159 C.L.R. 461, 464-5; Cook v Cook (1986) 162 C.L.R. 376, 390; R.S. 
Geddes, ‘The authority of Privy Council decisions in Australian courts’ (1978) 9 Fed L Rev 427. 
54 P. Finn, ‘Unity, the divergence: The Privy Council, the common law of England and the common laws of 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand’ in A. Robertson and M. Tilbury (eds), The Common Law of Obligations: 
Divergence and Unity (Hart, 2016) 38.   
55 K.J. Keith, ‘The unity of the common law and the ending of appeals to the Privy Council’ (2005) 54 I.C.L.Q. 
197, 205.   
56 Section 3(1)(i), Supreme Court Act 2003 (NZ). The Act came into force on 1 January 2004, officially 
establishing the New Zealand Supreme Court, and at the same time ending appeals to the Privy Council in relation 
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therefore, can offer little assistance due to the fairly recent demise of the Privy Council (the 
last case was heard by the Privy Council only in March 2015).57 Canada also offers a far earlier 
comparator and one affected by distinct considerations, for example, the late development of 
university law schools and, Laskin has argued, a conservative tradition which meant that it was 
only in the early 1970s that a distinct Canadian jurisdiction came to the fore.58   
In contrast, in Australia, even prior to 1986, there had been longstanding discussion of the 
treatment of case-law from both the House of Lords and Privy Council.  For much of the 20th 
century, the Australian courts had tended to treat the House of Lords as having the same 
authority as the Privy Council in the absence of any evidence of dissent between the two courts.  
Such a practice was justified on the basis that it would avoid circuity of action and subsequent 
waste of resources; the same judges operating in both courts.59  By the 1960s, however, such 
uncritical support was coming to an end. Dixon J. famously in Parker v R,60 argued that, 
contrary to existing authority, the Australian courts should follow the High Court of Australia 
(HCA), not the House of Lords, in case of conflict. Kitto J in Skelton v Collins61 agreed that 
while decisions of the House of Lords must necessarily be regarded as having “peculiarly high 
persuasive value” and the courts were still bound by decisions of the Privy Council, nothing 
should diminish the binding force of decisions of the HCA in Australian law. In 1986, the 
perhaps inevitable final step was taken to reduce all Privy Council decisions to persuasive 
authority in Australian law. 
 
Australia then provides a good example of a jurisdiction which, in living memory, has moved 
away from the dominance of a supranational court and is dealing with the issues of 
interpretation and analysis this paper is examining.  It is clear that abolishing the right of appeal 
to the Privy Council has encouraged the growth of “local” versions of the common law, adapted 
to that country's own characteristics and the customs of its people.62  The next two sections will 
examine three case studies from contract and tort, and citation data to see whether, in terms of 
metrics, my analysis is supported by citation research.  The aim will be to identify factors which 
indicate to what extent Australian law still regards decisions of the UK Supreme Court/House 
of Lords and JCPC as relevant and how persuasive these decisions are in practice. 
3.1 Three practical examples. 
 
This section will examine three examples taken from private law in which the Australian High 
Court was asked to consider the relevance and persuasive force of decisions not only of the 
Privy Council, but also of the UK Supreme Court/House of Lords.  As Justice Gleeson has 
commented, “in terms of judicial authority and leadership, the distinction between the House 
of Lords and Privy Council was largely technical. They were the same judges, and they 
                                                          
to all decisions of New Zealand courts made after 31 December 2003. This New Zealand legislation does not, 
however, affect rights of appeal from the Cook Islands and Niue. 
57 Pora v The Queen [2015] UKPC 9. 
58 See B. Laskin, ‘The Supreme Court of Canada’ (1951) 29 Can Bar Rev 1046; J. Saywell, The Lawmakers: 
Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism (University of Toronto Press, 2002). 
59 Piro v W. Foster & Co (1943) 68 C.L.R. 313, 320 per Latham C.J. Termed by Leigh a “sensible rule of 
convenience”: L.H. Leigh (1965) 28 M.L.R. 104, 109. 
60 (1963) 111 C.L.R. 610, 632-633.  See also Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren (1967) 117 CLR 221, 
238; [1969] 1 AC 590, 641 (PC accepting that HCA was right not to follow the decision of the UKHL on 
exemplary damages). 
61 (1966) 115 C.L.R. 94, 104. 
62 See e.g. M. Vranken, ‘Australia’ in J.M. Smits, Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (2nd ed., Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2012), J Toohey, ‘Towards an Australian Common Law’ (1990) 6 Aust Bar Rev 185. 
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declared the law for all those courts from whom appeals might come to them.”63  As we will 
see, while the courts do still refer to UK/Privy Council authority, the persuasive force of such 
judgments will depend on their merits.64  In the words of a leading Australian judge: 
 
There is … every reason why we should fashion a common law for Australia that is best suited to our conditions 
and circumstances … The value of English judgments, like Canadian, New Zealand and for that matter United 
States judgments, depends on the persuasive force of their reasoning.65 
 
Such arguments cohere nicely with those of the Brexiteers.  Leaving the European Union, they 
assert, will allow the UK to regain its sovereignty and the freedom to ignore future decisions 
of the CJEU which are not consistent with common law legal development.  It will allow 
English law to revert to ‘pure’ common law reasoning.   The case studies examined below will 
seek to identify factors which will assist us in answering the question whether future decisions 
of the CJEU will nevertheless continue to influence the interpretation of retained EU private 
law. 
 
Example One: Learner drivers and breach of duty in negligence 
 
Cook v Cook,66 decided in the wake of the Australia Acts, provides an obvious starting point 
for examining the relationship between UK and Australian courts post-abolition.  The case 
concerned the standard of care expected of a learner driver. The majority of the Full Court of 
South Australia had followed the views of the majority of the English Court of Appeal in 
Nettleship v Weston to the effect that the duty of care owed by a learner driver to an instructor 
passenger was the ordinary standard “measured objectively by the care to be expected of an 
experienced, skilled and careful driver”.67 The minority judge (King CJ) had preferred to follow 
an Australian case.68  The High Court cited almost an equal number of Australian and English 
authorities, but it is noticeable while the English authority is used to establish general principle 
(e.g. Donoghue v Stevenson69 and Hedley Byrne v Heller70), the High Court was determined to 
follow “the clear trend of authority in this country to the effect that special and exceptional 
circumstances can transform the ordinary relationship of driver and passenger into a special 
one.”71  It added that:  
 
... in this country … it has long been accepted that it is for the legislature, and not the courts, to decide whether 
considerations of social policy make it desirable that the traditional standards of the law of negligence should be 
abandoned in favour of a system of liability without fault.72 
 
                                                          
63 M. Gleeson, ‘The influence of the Privy Council on Australia’ (2007) 29 Aust. Bar Rev 123, 129. 
64 See Justices Kirby (High Court of Australia) and Sharpe (Court of Appeal for Ontario) in ch 19: ‘The Old 
Commonwealth’ in L Blom-Cooper QC, B Dickson and G Drewry (eds), The Judicial House of Lords 1876-2009 
(OUP 2009). 
65 A Mason, ‘Future Directions in Australian Law’ (1987) 13 Monash L R 149, 154.  
66 [1986] HCA 73, (1986) 162 C.L.R. 376, 385. 
67 [1971] 2 Q.B. 691, 702. While not a House of Lords judgment, it is regarded in English law as authoritative on 
this question. 
68 The Insurance Commissioner v Joyce (1948) 77 C.L.R. 39, relying largely on the judgments of Latham CJ and 
Dixon J. 
69 [1932] A.C. 562. 
70 [1964] A.C. 465. 
71 (n 66) para. 11 (emphasis added). 
72 Ibid., para.12. 
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Although the Court in Imbree v McNeilly73 overturned Cook and rejected the ruling that 
allowance should be made for the inexperience of the learner, this was achieved with reference 
to subsequent decisions of the High Court:  
 
 … what distinguishes the principle established in Cook v Cook from cases of the kind just mentioned is that Cook 
v Cook requires the application of a different standard of care …. In all other cases in which a different level of 
care is demanded, the relevant standard of care is applied uniformly … The principle adopted in Cook v Cook 
departed from fundamental principle and achieved no useful result.74 
 
What we see is a preference for national courts to dictate matters of social policy and of 
constitutional importance, such as the relationship of the legislature and the courts. Lord 
Denning MR in Nettleship is condemned for overstepping his role as a judge.  In relation to 
such matters, therefore, external sources are likely to be less persuasive.  
 
Example two: Promissory estoppel as a cause of action 
The second example illustrates the willingness of the Australian courts to diverge from the 
approach of the English courts despite the common foundational sources. Both jurisdictions 
had expressed reluctance for many years to allow promissory estoppel to become the vehicle 
for the positive enforcement of a representation by a party that she would do something in the 
future on the basis that it might outflank the doctrine of consideration.75  Nevertheless, in 
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher76 the majority of the High Court held that promissory 
estoppel could, in an appropriate case, create a cause of action.  By favouring a greater 
emphasis on unconscionability, the crucial question became: was the appellant entitled to stand 
by in silence when it must have known that the respondents were proceeding on the assumption 
that they had an agreement and that completion of the exchange was a formality?77  It was held 
that the appellant was estopped in all the circumstances from retreating from its implied 
promise to complete the contract. 
The decision in Walton Stores is important in that it challenges English orthodoxy not simply 
on the point whether promissory estoppel can apply prior to contract, but in terms of the very 
relationship between estoppel and consideration in contract law, the remedies available to the 
court in estoppel cases,78  and to what extent a more flexible concept of equitable estoppel was 
needed.79  In moving towards a willingness to see notions of good faith and unconscionability 
in the pre-contractual phase,80 rejected by the House of Lords in no uncertain terms in Walford 
v Miles,81  and a broader principle of equitable estoppel, we see again the Australian courts 
taking their own distinct view on matters of policy and principle.  ‘Classic’ English authority 
                                                          
73 [2008] HCA 40, (2008) 236 C.L.R. 510. 
74 Ibid., paras. 70-72 per Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ. 
75 As stated by Denning LJ in Combe v Combe [1951] 2 K.B. 215, 220.  See also Hughes v Metropolitan Railway 
Co. (1877) 2 App Cas 439, 448; Gray v Lang (1955) 56 SR(NSW) 7, 13.  
76 [1988] HCA 7, (1988) 164 C.L.R. 387. 
77 Ibid., para.36. 
78 See A. Robertson, ’Reliance and expectation in estoppel remedies’ (1998) 18 L.S. 360; J. Edelman, ‘Remedial 
certainty or remedial discretion in estoppel after Giumelli’ (1999) 15 JCL 179. 
79 See E. McKendrick, Contract Law (12th ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) para.5.28; M. Chen-Wishart, Contract 
Law (6th ed. OUP, 2018) at 158-161. 
80 See A.F. Mason, ‘Contract, good faith and equitable standards in fair dealing’ (2000) 116 L.Q.R. 66, 90 and 
Finn (n 54) 47. 
81  [1992] 2 A.C. 128.  See J. Cumberbatch, ‘In freedom's cause: the contract to negotiate’ (1992) 12 O.J.L.S. 586. 
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such as High Trees,82 Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co83 and Combe v Combe,84  and Privy 
Council85 authority is cited,  but notably reference is also made to Australian scholarship, 
including Paul Finn’s essay on ‘Equitable Estoppel’86 and the Greig and Davis Contract Law 
textbook.87 Reference is also made to the direct enforcement of promises made without 
consideration by means of promissory estoppel in the United States Restatement on Contracts 
2d 90,88 although the Court did flag the need for caution due to the fact that the US doctrine of 
promissory estoppel has developed partly in response to its particularly narrow bargain theory 
of consideration.89 Context is important. 
Duthie noted the division which ensued between the two jurisdictions: 
The approach of the High Court of Australia has been to expand the category of rights to which equity will have 
regard beyond positive, enforceable rights, to include those rights which one party is capable of conferring upon 
another. It remains to be seen whether the English courts will follow suit.90 
The English courts did not follow suit.  In Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer Plc,91 
the Court of Appeal stated clearly that “English law, as it now stands, does not permit the 
enforcement of an estoppel in the form alleged in this case.”92 The Court of Appeal held that 
there was no real prospect of the claim succeeding unless and until the law is developed, or 
corrected, by the House of Lords.  This has not occurred. 
 
In seeking relevant authority, then, the Australian courts not only look beyond the UK to the 
United States, but are not afraid to develop policy and principle in a distinctive Australian 
fashion.   This does not mean that the Australian law of estoppel is divorced completely from 
English law.  Commentators have noted that there remains some debate in Australia whether 
Walton Stores did indeed create an independent cause of action based on promissory estoppel 
or whether it should still be regarded as acting in a defensive capacity.93 Bryan observes, for 
example, that more recently the High Court has been less inclined to embark on the exercise of 
reshaping fundamental doctrine where innovation is unnecessary to decide the case at hand, 
and that, on that basis, there is a “new sobriety” in the HCA with Waltons Stores making only 
fleeting appearances in the judgments.94   
 
Walton Stores highlights that the nature of persuasive authority post-Australia Acts is one of 
ongoing dialogue within the common law.  Nevertheless, where the courts believe that a change 
                                                          
82 Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] K.B. 130. 
83 (1877) 2 App Cas 439. 
84 [1951] 2 K.B. 215. 
85 Ajayi v Briscoe [1964] 1 WLR 1326; Bank Negara Indonesia v Philip Hoalim (1973) 2 MLJ 3; Attorney-
General of Hong Kong v Humphreys Estate Ltd [1987] 1 A.C. 114. 
86 See P.D. Finn, (ed.), Essays in Equity (Sydney: Law Book Co, 1985). 
87  DW Greig and JLR Davis, The Law of Contract (Law Book Co., 1987). 
88 Citing E.A. Farnsworth, Contracts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982) 2.19; G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 
(Columbus, Ohio, 1974), 129.  
89 Walton Stores (n 76) para.24. 
90 A. Duthie, ‘Equitable estoppel, unconscionability and the enforcement of promises’ (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 362, 
366. 
91 [2001] EWCA Civ 274; [2002] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 737. 
92 Morritt VC ibid., at para. 39. 
93 See A. Sillink, ‘Can promissory estoppel be an independent source of rights?’ (2016) 40 UWA L Rev 39 who 
has identified ongoing uncertainty in some Australia states whether promissory estoppel can be an independent 
sources of rights: see, for example, Saleh v Romanous (2010) NSWCA 274, (2010) 79 NSWLR 453 which (obiter) 
stated that it is “negative in substance” (Handley JA at para. 74).  
94 M. Bryan, ‘Almost 25 years on: some reflections on Waltons v Maher’ (2012) 6 Journal of Equity 131, 134.  
 12 
 
in the law is needed, the High Court is more than willing to reject the UK/Privy Council 
position in favour of one deemed more consistent with national needs.  
 
Example three - A legislative example: Contributory negligence and contract law 
 
The final example considers the interpretation of UK-based legislation post-abolition.  This 
offers a particularly useful perspective in that the problems facing the courts in interpreting 
s.6(2) are likely to arise in relation to UK legislation transposing EU directives.  In common 
with many common law jurisdictions, Australian states and territories chose to enact legislation 
which followed the wording of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (UK).  
One issue which has arisen is the extent to which the Act can apply to cases where there is 
concurrent liability in contract and tort. The English court in  Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta 
v Butcher95 resolved that where the contractual duty of care is the same as liability in the tort 
of negligence, the 1945 Act should apply.  Faced with the same question of statutory 
interpretation in 1999, the High Court in Astley v Austrust Ltd96 chose to differ.  Despite the 
wording of s.27A, Wrongs Act 1936 (SA) being identical to s.4 of the 1945 Act, the High Court 
refused to be persuaded by the reasoning in Vesta v Butcher and held that the defence of 
contributory negligence would be confined to liability in tort: 
The natural and ordinary meaning of s 27A(3), read in the light of the definitions contained in the section, indicates 
that the section is concerned with claims in tort rather than claims in contract. The sub-section was designed to 
remedy the evil that the negligence of a plaintiff, no matter how small, which contributed to the suffering of 
damage, defeated any action in tort in respect of that damage.97 
The Court found nothing in the ordinary and natural meaning of the section that could be said 
to assume or by necessary implication authorise the apportionment of damages in claims for 
breach of contract. On its face, therefore, the section dealt only with actions in tort.  This 
conclusion was supported by the wording of the text and the history of the provision.  While 
Vesta was discussed by the Court, with  acknowledgement that at least initially some Australian 
courts had followed its approach, the High Court simply labelled these cases as “wrong”, and 
criticised them for flawed reasoning in straining the wording of the statute and ignoring “the 
mischief which the legislation was intended to remedy.”98 
Although political considerations have led to a legislative reversal of this decision,99 it 
represents a good example of the tension that can arise when courts, faced with exactly the 
same wording, sources and interpretative tools reach very different conclusions as to the 
meaning of a statutory provision.100  In Vesta the court is clearly prepared to adopt a more 
liberal approach, reaching the desired result by a rather technical interpretation of sections 1 
and 4 of the Act;101 Astley adheres more strictly to rules of common law statutory 
                                                          
95 [1989] A.C. 852, 875, cited with approval in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates [1995] 2 A.C. 145.  See also 
Mouat v Clark Boyce [1992] 2 NZLR 559, 564-565 (New Zealand). 
96 (1999) 197 C.L.R. 1. 
97 Ibid., para.41. 
98 Ibid., para.70. 
99 See Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Amendment Act 2000 (NSW); Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Amendment Act 2001 (Qld), for example. 
100 See T.M. Fitzpatrick, ‘Contributory Negligence and Contract—A Critical Reassessment’ (2001) 30 C.L.W.R. 
255. 
101 See O’Connor L.J. in Vesta (n 95) 862. 
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interpretation102 and leaves it for the legislature to intervene. Both are responding to a situation 
which did not arise when the 1945 statute was drafted: concurrent liability in contract and 
tort.103  The court in Vesta achieves the practical result that an injured party cannot evade the 
defence by simply suing in contract where she also had a claim in tort.104  For the Australian 
courts, this is a step too far.  As Fitzpatrick noted, the issue here is not what canon of statutory 
interpretation one uses, but rather the “leeways of choice” which the judiciary possess in 
deciding how to interpret the law.105 A common form of wording does not necessarily, 
therefore, lead to a common application of the law.  s.6(1) of the 2018 Act makes it very clear 
that while s.6(3) indicates that retained EU law should be interpreted purposively, the CJEU 
has no future mandate in correcting any mis-interpretations (in its view) of EU law by the UK 
courts.  s.6(2) leaves it to the UK courts to determine to what extent they choose to have regard 
to any relevant subsequent decisions of the CJEU. 
 
 
3.2 Understanding persuasive authority in the High Court of Australia: Citation data. 
 
The treatment of persuasive authority, then, will vary: it may be of minor suppletive importance 
or recognised as an authoritative text, depending on the needs of practice and the choices of 
the courts.106 A number of citation studies has sought to identify the impact of foreign 
precedents on the courts of Commonwealth countries.  Notably in Australia the work of Russell 
Smyth has provided some revealing data on the citation practices of the courts.107 On a basic 
level, while the principle of stare decisis requires citation of authority, persuasive authority 
will only be used where it is seen to assist in the development of legal principle and regarded 
as increasing the force of the judge’s reasoning.108  Trends in citation practice, therefore, 
provide a window into what courts regard as sound legal reasoning over time. Further studies 
have identified prestige and reputation as important factors, with certain courts (e.g. US 
Supreme Court; Supreme Court of Canada; UK Supreme Court) having particular resonance 
in the common law world.109 Merryman agrees: “the fact of citation gives a work authority to 
some degree and thus it will exert some influence on the way the law grows.”110   
 
                                                          
102 Notably the literal, golden and mischief rules: see F. Bennion, Understanding Common Law Legislation: 
Drafting and interpretation (OUP, 2009) who argues that these are not in reality the sole criteria used by the courts 
and that values and culture are also relevant.  
103 The High Court in Astley (n 96, paras.47-48) recognised the validity of the UK decision, Henderson v Merrett 
Syndicates [1995] 2 A.C. 145. 
104 See E. Peel, Treitel: The Law of Contract (14th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) at 20-110; O’Connor L.J. in 
Vesta [1989] A.C. 852, 860; A.S. Burrows, ‘Contributory Negligence – a Defence to Breach of Contract?’ 
(1985) 101 L.Q.R. 161, 164. 
105 Fitzpatrick (n 100) 271. 
106 Glenn (n 51) 264. 
107 For example, see R. Smyth, ‘Citations by Court’ in M. Coper, A. Blackshield and G. Williams (eds), The 
Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (OUP Melbourne, 2001) 98; R. Smyth, ‘Other than “Accepted 
Sources of Law”?: A Quantitative Study of Secondary Source Citations in the High Court’ (1999) 22 UNSWLJ 
19; R. Smyth, ‘Academic Writing and the Courts: A Quantitative Study of the Influence of Legal and Non-legal 
Periodicals in the High Court’ (1998) 17 University of Tasmania L Rev 164.   
108 I Nielsen and R Smyth, ‘One Hundred Years of Citation of Authority on the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales’ (2008) 31 UNSWLJ 189, 192-193. 
109 J Bell, ‘The Relevance of Foreign Examples to Legal Development’ (2011) 21 Duke J Comp & Intl L 433; C 
McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ 
(2000) 20 O.J.L.S. 499; B Flanagan and S Ahern, ‘Judicial Decision-Making and Transnational Law: A Survey 
of Common Law Supreme Court Judges’ (2011) 60 I.C.L.Q. 1. 
110 J.H. Merryman, ‘The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950’ (1954) 6 
Stanford Law Review 613. 
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Looking at citations post- Australia Acts 1986 in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 
2008,111 Nielsen and Smyth found that while decisions of the House of Lords and English Court 
of Appeal are not binding on the State Supreme Courts, they have always been regarded as 
highly persuasive. Nevertheless, the status of English case law in Australia has diminished 
since 1986.  While decisions of the House of Lords and English Court of Appeal continue to 
be given great respect, Australian courts are now much less likely to follow them than was once 
the case. Privy Council decisions are also now cited rarely, largely due to their limited number 
following the abolition of appeals from all the major Commonwealth countries.112   Since 1965, 
they find that citations of English authorities as a proportion of total citations have been on a 
downward spiral.113 Instead increased reference is being made to other common law 
jurisdictions, notably New Zealand, United States and Canada.114  
 
Smyth’s research into citation patterns in the High Court of Australia reaches similar 
conclusions.  He finds that whilst in 1920 and 1940 the High Court cited English decisions 
more than decisions of Australian courts, in 1960, 1980 and 1996, there were increases both in 
the number of Australian cases cited by the Court and in the proportion of Australian cases 
relative to the proportion of English cases. In particular, in 1920, the Privy Council received 
13.5 per cent of total citations, but in 1996 the comparable figure was just 2.2 per cent. In 
contrast, citations of previous decisions of the High Court increased from 24 per cent in 1920 
to 47.4 per cent in 1996. Further, citations of foreign precedents other than those of English 
courts have been on the increase.   In cases, for example, such as Cattanach v Melchior115 
which raise issues of moral and social policy such as wrongful birth, the High Court has also 
drawn on civil law sources and the law of South Africa.  In Smyth’s view, this provides clear 
evidence to support the view that since the abolition of appeals from the High Court to the 
Privy Council, a new Australian jurisprudence is emerging, in which the Court's role as a final 
court of appeal has been enhanced.  By this means, the HCA is developing “a common law 
suited to Australia’s needs.”116 
 
Such results are consistent with research undertaken in New Zealand and Canada.  Since 
abolition, the New Zealand Supreme Court (NZSC) has been hearing a much higher volume 
and broader range of appeals.  Lyon asserts that the NZSC is, as a result, now able to cite more 
New Zealand jurisprudence and uses a broader range of case-law.117   Citation of English cases, 
although still substantial, has declined relative to the citation of cases from other 
jurisdictions.118 Smithey in her study of Canadian and South African constitutional law also 
notes continued use of foreign law due to its utility in cutting information costs, decreasing 
uncertainty, and providing a justification for legal development. This is matched, however, by 
a decline in reliance on foreign sources as time passes and the availability of indigenous 
                                                          
111 n 108. 
112 J. Goldring, The Privy Council and the Australian Constitution (University of Tasmania Press, 1996) 73–80. 
See also Sawer (n 26), 145.  
113 Nielsen and Smyth (n 108) at 208-209. 
114 See B. Topperwien, ‘Foreign precedents’ in Coper et al (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of 
Australia (OUP, 2001) 280.  See also Gleeson (n 63) 133. 
115 (2003) 215 C.L.R. 1, paras.131-132 
116 R. Smyth, ‘Citations by court’ (n 107). 
117 R. Lyon, ‘Independence, access to justice, and the patriation of New Zealand’s Final Court of Appeal’ (LLM 
thesis, 2014). 
118 For a study prior to abolition of the right to appeal to the Privy Council in 2004, see, R. Smyth, ‘Judicial 
Citations - An Empirical Study of Citation Practice in the New Zealand Court of Appeal’ (2000) 31 Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review 847.   
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constitutional precedent increases.119 Foreign precedent, she asserts, is found to be particularly 
useful when there were higher rates of disagreement and their need for justification was highest 
– its raison d’ être is its utility. 
 
4. Commonwealth comparisons – Lessons to be learnt for post-Brexit private law? 
 
A number of Australian commentators have reflected on the changes which have followed 
since the Australia Acts ended the final link between the JCPC and HCA.  Vranken remarks 
on the fact that while in colonial times the application of English law in Australia was deemed 
self-evident, post-1986, despite being only persuasive authority, Australian court decisions do 
still cite English case-law, at times in great detail.120  Luntz has noted, however, that in tort law 
at least, this has not stopped the Australian courts developing their own tests for key concepts 
such as breach of duty and vicarious liability.121 Justice Michael Kirby has also noticed that the 
High Court has deviated from the line taken by the House of Lords on a growing number of 
issues, for example in relation to damages for gratuitous services,122  immunity for barristers’ 
negligence,123  nervous shock,124  and many other topics.125 It would seem that a distinctive 
Australian identity is being consciously fostered.126 
What guidance, then, can we draw from the above experience in relation to the likely 
interpretation of retained EU private law post-Brexit?  The UK government has given no 
indication that it intends to overturn legislation based on EU directives in this field.  Statutes 
such as the 2015 Consumer Rights Act will remain, containing rights based on EU law, namely 
the provisions of the Consumer Sales Directive 99/44/EC, the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Directive 93/13/EEC and the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU. The 
Consumer Protection Act 1987 Part I will further continue to offer consumers the benefit of 
strict liability based on the Product Liability Directive 1985/374/EEC.  Other examples may 
be found in both contract, commercial and tort law.127  To what extent, then, is the interpretation 
of these provisions, whose primary source was EU law, likely to remain close to that found in 
the EU?  Will the national courts continue to refer to decisions of the CJEU or move towards 
a more traditional common law interpretation?  The Act merely requires that the courts refer to 
retained case-law and principles (s.6(3)) – subsequent guidance emanating from the EU may 
be regarded so far as it is relevant (s.6(2)).  Leading contract lawyer McKendrick takes the 
view that “[j]udicial comity would appear to demand that some weight be given to [CJEU] 
                                                          
119 S.I. Smithey, ‘A tool, not a master: The use of foreign case law in Canada and South Africa’ (2001) 34(10) 
Comparative Political Studies 1188.  See also G. Gentili, ‘Canada: Protecting rights in a worldwide culture. An 
empirical study of the use of foreign precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada (1982-2010)’ in T. Groppi et al, 
The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges (Hart Publishing, 2013) and B. Roy, ‘An empirical 
survey of foreign jurisprudence and international instruments in charter litigation’ (2004) 62v U Toronto Fac L 
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decisions [post-Brexit], although the precise weight to be attributed may depend upon the facts 
and circumstances of the individual case.”128  The key question then is, assuming courts still 
refer to CJEU decisions, just how persuasive will they be once the obligation to follow such 
case-law has been removed. 
It is submitted that drawing on the experience in Australia is useful in identifying four key 
factors which the Australian courts have treated as important in citing UK case-law.  First, a 
clear issue is one of respect for a court which is deemed to have authority/prestige and deliver 
high quality judgments.  Justice Gleeson, for example, notes that decisions of the UK Supreme 
Court and Privy Council are powerful formal sources of international influence.129  The High 
Court in Cook v Cook equally remarked that it was inevitable and desirable that the Australian 
courts should continue to obtain assistance and guidance from the learning and reasoning of 
the UK courts.130  Justice Kirby goes further and argues that “the integrity of courts, the judicial 
methodology, and the basic doctrines of the legal order constitute some of the most precious 
exports of the United Kingdom to the whole world.”131   
 
Secondly, as a common law jurisdiction whose sources are part of the historical framework of 
Australian law and still found in textbooks and cited in court, the historical legacy is 
significant.  The countries have been tied together since the late 18th century colonisation of 
Australia, with the colonists inheriting English case and statute law as was applicable, in the 
famous words of Blackstone, “to their own situation and the condition of the infant colony”.132 
Despite the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, the Australian courts 
continued to follow English law for much of the 20th century; the High Court decision in Parker 
v R in 1963 being taken to signify a change in approach, laying the foundations for the law we 
see today.   As Justice Kirby has observed, the result is a common methodology and shared 
basic doctrines which encourage ongoing ties between the systems.133  
  
From this follows a third point – that of dialogue and communication.  The ties between 
English and Australian lawyers remain to this day.  Justice Edelman of the High Court of 
Australia provides a modern example of a lawyer, educated in Australia and the UK, appointed 
to a chair in the Law of Obligations at the University of Oxford prior to being appointed to the 
bench in Australia.  It is clear that UK and Australian lawyers, judges and practitioners share a 
dialogue, as evidenced by the biennial Obligations conferences founded by the University of 
Melbourne, but held in common law jurisdictions across the world.134  This does not mean that 
they will always agree, but they understand the meta-language of the common law with its 
shared values, procedural rules and terminology.   
 
Finally, there is the issue of legislative change.  The examples given above feature areas of 
contract and tort law where principles are shared and legislature is exactly worded.  Australian 
                                                          
128 E. McKendrick, Contract Law (12th ed., Palgrave, 2017) 336 (emphasis added).   
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Justices have recognised, however, that over time, legislation in the UK and Australia will 
diverge even in the laws of contract and tort.135  The impact, for example, of EU law on UK 
contract and tort law and the Civil Liability Acts introduced across Australia in the early 
2000s136 have inevitably made citation of UK law of limited, if any, relevance in the 
interpretation of specific statutory provisions.  While, therefore, UK law may be regarded as 
persuasive in relation to legal principle, legislative inconsistency will force the courts to 
prioritise their own domestic case-law. 
 
If we apply these four factors to the question raised in this article, then the picture post-Brexit, 
despite the express terms of s.6(2) allowing the courts to refer to relevant CJEU authority, looks 
somewhat pessimistic for those hoping that the UK courts will continue to reach to EU sources 
for guidance in the long term. Even if the courts are prepared to recognise such authority as 
“relevant” – and it is difficult to see how this can be denied in terms of a CJEU ruling directly 
on the meaning of a particular provision of a Directive – the question of respect may diminish 
the persuasive nature of such authority.  While many UK judges do have respect the judgments 
of the CJEU, the very different methodology of the court – both in terms of drafting judgments 
and lack of a doctrine of precedent – has left the UK courts uncertain at times of the quality of 
the guidance they obtain.  One classic tort example involves an art. 267 reference on the 
limitation period imposed by the Product Liability Directive in relation to a claim brought in 
2002.  (The preliminary reference procedure being the main means by which national courts 
seek guidance on the interpretation of EU law).  The first decision of the CJEU (O’Byrne v 
Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd137) provided the rather oblique guidance that “it is as a rule for national 
law to determine the conditions ... A national court . . . must, however, ensure that due regard 
is had to the personal scope of Directive 85/374, as established by articles 1 and 3 thereof”.138  
This less than straightforward statement resulted in a second reference to the European Court 
of Justice in 2008 requesting clarification.139 The matter was finally resolved by the Grand 
Chamber in 2009.140  It was only in 2010, seven years after the initial claim had been stayed to 
resolve this point, that the UK court was able to state that the action would not be permitted 
under the Directive in question.  Such examples do not assist in building trust between the 
national courts and the CJEU in terms of either the preliminary reference procedure or the 
clarity of the guidance provided therefrom. 
 
Arnull has indicated that part of the problem may be the style and content of CJEU 
judgments.141  The CJEU, as a court of its Member States, consisting of one judge from each 
EU country, reflects the views of lawyers across Europe but importantly of a mixture of legal 
traditions: civil law, Scandinavian law, mixed jurisdictions, with the common law in the 
minority.   The style in which judgments are written, originally modelled on the civil law legal 
tradition (notably that of the French Conseil d’Etat and Cour de cassation), means, Arnull 
argues, that they lack sureness of touch when dealing with previous decisions and rarely engage 
in serious interpretive or policy analysis.142  He is particularly critical of the absence of 
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dissenting opinions which, he suggests, might reduce the pressure on the CJEU to 
accommodate within its judgments points of view which are essentially irreconcilable, leading 
to a lack of clarity.143 EU judgments are, he asserts, impenetrable to non-specialists and often 
make no real attempt to persuade a sceptical reader of the correctness of the result.  Other 
commentators have noted that EU law requires the UK courts to engage with different modes 
of reasoning, notably a purposive or teleological approach,144 and distinct policy goals.145 
 
Such criticisms serve to highlight that even after 40 years of judgments, common lawyers are 
far from reconciled to the style of CJEU judgments and the different methodology of a non-
common law court.  There remains an underlying suspicion, therefore, of a lack of quality.  
This might seem surprising given that the CJEU is a specialist court with obvious expertise in 
EU law.  Nevertheless, Elaine Mak in her fascinating study of UK citation patterns has 
highlighted that UK judges find judgments of the CJEU difficult to read, describing them as 
“Delphic”, containing at times “flabby reasoning”.146  For Stanton, it is a matter of the common 
law mind set.  Common law judges place a heavy reliance on the discovery of policies and 
principles within the text of cases.147  This impedes, in his view, recognition of the value of 
case-law which has no concept of stare decisis or favours a different methodology.  
 
Stanton’s argument is linked in many ways to the second factor identified above - the historical 
ties between UK and EU law.  The UK joined the EU in 1973, but study of EU law only became 
compulsory in UK universities in the 1990s.  It also took some time for States to appreciate 
that EU law would intervene in both public and private law matters.148  We see, for example, 
the emergence of EU principles of tort law from the 1980s onward.149 In contrast with the 
development of the common law over centuries, this is a short timeframe (it also means that 
much of the current judiciary will not even have studied EU law during their undergraduate 
degrees).  Comparative studies have shown that despite the influence of EU (and ECHR) law, 
in general, English judges continue to prefer using comparative law material from other 
common law jurisdictions rather than that of the EU or other EU Members States.150 From the 
universities perspective, post-2019 many are likely to make study of EU law optional, 
competing against other optional units such as international trade and WTO law.  The reality 
is that, in private law, EU law has never had the impact seen in areas such as employment and 
competition law.  Private law is still seen as “common law” with limited intervention by EU 
directives since 1973.  Further, many of the rights noted above form part of general Acts of 
Parliament.  Statutes such as the Consumer Rights Act 2015 mix EU- and UK-sourced rights 
without any acknowledgement of their original sources.  While private lawyers may continue 
to ponder the meaning of “defect” under s.3 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 and “good 
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faith” under s.62 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015,151  it is difficult to argue that this factor is 
as powerful as seen in relation to Australia. 
 
One means of overcoming the deficiencies in factors (i) and (ii) above, however, would be that 
of dialogue and communication.  If post-Brexit, academics, practitioners, and the judiciary 
continue to engage with EU law and decisions of the CJEU, an ongoing positive relationship 
is more likely to follow.  At present there are many manifestations of such dialogue – the 
foundation of the European Law Institute152; the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe 
which claims to be “the voice of the European legal profession”,153 the European Consumers 
Association154 - and judicial engagement, for example in the Network of the Presidents of the 
Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU.155  Will membership of these organisations continue post-
Brexit?  How easy will such conversations be?  Pragmatically, it remains the case that once 
one is no longer a President of a Supreme Judicial Court of the EU, maintaining a dialogue will 
require more effort.  Lord Reed in a recent speech, while praising his European counterparts, 
noted nonetheless that Supreme Court judges had more long-standing ties with the common 
law courts with which it shared a common language, procedure and style of judgment. 
Mastering a shared European cultural tradition had been “a challenge”.156  
 
One final issue is that of legislative change and this goes straight to the heart of the question 
of relevance.  s.6(2) only permits reference to EU sources when “relevant”.  Can EU law be 
said to satisfy this criterion if, due to legislative change, it no longer mirrors that retained on 
Brexit day?  In his State of the Union address in September 2017, the European Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker announced that the Commission planned to introduce a “New 
Deal for Consumers”, which would strengthen the enforcement of EU consumer law.  Recent 
proposals include a new directive which would amend Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair 
terms, Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices and Directive 2011/83/EU on 
consumer rights.157  This is in addition to the 2015 proposals for new maximum harmonisation 
directives which would regulate contracts for the supply of digital content158 and sale of goods 
contracts.159 If the UK had stayed in the EU, these measures (if brought into force) would have 
led to reforms to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and related statutory instruments and would 
potentially have introduced new rights to consumers. Post-Brexit and any agreed transition 
period, such measures raise the prospect that UK law will differ from that of the rest of the EU, 
and, more significantly, that the “relevance” of decisions of the CJEU will be diminished.  On 
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a positive level, the UK legislator may wish to examine whether such changes should be 
mirrored in English law, notably to avoid increasing transaction costs for businesses which are 
likely to rise in the face of substantial divergence in cross-border contract law. Further, there 
has been considerable discussion of the benefits of regulatory equivalence despite Brexit, 
notably in the field of financial services and goods.160 For political and economic reasons, 
therefore, it may not be desirable for UK law to diverge too far from EU practice.  This suggests 
that the question of relevance may differ from sector to sector depending on political, rather 
than judicial, decision-making.  This does little to clarify the operation of s.6(2) bar that it may 
be context-dependent.   
 
 
5. Conclusion: 
 
In the Miller case the UK Supreme Court held that: 
Upon the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union … those legal rules derived from EU law and 
transposed into UK law by domestic legislation will have a different status. They will no longer be paramount, 
but will be open to domestic repeal or amendment in ways that may be inconsistent with EU law.161 
The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 makes it clear that, post-Brexit, areas of the 
private law such as consumer law where EU law has been active will remain unchanged, subject 
to legislative reversal or amendment or intervention by the Supreme Court.  In practice, then, 
rights transposed from EU law into Part 1 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 and the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 are likely to remain.  Precedents influenced by CJEU case-law such 
as A v National Blood Authority,162 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank163 
and Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis164  are still binding.   
Despite the obvious differences between Brexit and the ending of appeals to the Privy Council 
in Australia in the 1980s, a study of legal practice and citation data does reveal a number of 
factors which are likely to be influential in determining the extent to which the CJEU case-law 
will be regarded as relevant and persuasive in the interpretation of EU retained law once the 
ties with the EU and CJEU have been severed. As we have seen, issues of reputation/respect, 
historical ties, dialogue and communication and legislative change suggest that future CJEU 
case-law will have a diminishing persuasive effect.   It will require a positive effort by the UK 
courts to maintain a relationship with the CJEU and to continue to use its judgments to shape 
its understanding of EU retained law.   
 
Four conclusions may be thus drawn. 
 
First, that persuasion is not to be taken for granted.  The Australian courts have stressed that 
they may find UK (and indeed other common law authority) persuasive, but only when it merits 
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such a finding.  Above we noted the issue of respect for the body of the court, its style of 
reasoning and the clarity with which judgments are given.  We also noted that historical ties do 
seem to be a factor, but that this will only operate where ongoing contact and dialogue exists 
between the jurisdictions in question.  Such findings raise a number of interesting questions as 
to the future interaction of the UK courts and the EU.  The legislation places the onus on UK 
judges to determine the “relevance” of EU law. s.6(2) is merely permissive – it does not place 
a duty on the courts to refer to such law, but rather allows them to determine when it will be of 
relevance and says nothing of its persuasive force.   
Secondly, persuasion is likely to diminish with time.  Legislative change will lead to 
divergence unless the UK seeks to mirror new developments or pursue policies of equivalence.  
Such moves would be politically controversial, despite the fact that they may reduce transaction 
costs for businesses and offer consumers a uniform level of protection wherever they shop in 
Europe (or online).  New alliances may also lead to divergence.  Smyth, for example, has noted 
that one of the reasons for falling citation rates of UKSC decisions in Australian law has been 
UK membership of the European Union, which made English law less relevant to Australia, 
and the increasing influence in the UK of the European Convention on Human Rights since 
the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).165  New trade agreements and alliances 
may take UK law away from its EU counterparts, which, as noted above, are currently working 
on a number of key initiatives, notably in the field of consumer law. There is a possibility 
therefore of the UK operating a “retro”-EU law, whilst its former Member States move on. 
Thirdly, case-law is also likely to diverge as national dictates of policy may lead to, and indeed 
encourage, different interpretations and substantive development of the law.  The case studies 
in this paper have been helpful in illustrating that common foundations do not necessarily result 
in identical application of the rules.  Even a statute, identically worded, can lead to divergence.  
There seems no reason why the same will not happen with EU law. Macmillan argues that this 
will put under threat measures which arise largely from EU initiatives and do not draw upon a 
traditional common law basis.166   We can expect, therefore, a narrow interpretation of 
measures which do not fit within future national policy initiatives.    Indeed, HCA Chief Justice 
Kiefel recently observed that the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council forced judges to 
examine whether the law in place was consistent with Australian society in 1986,167  leaving 
much to the perception of judges. Will the UK Supreme Court take up the opportunity offered 
by the 2018 Act to overturn CJEU case-law or, more likely, will reference to such case-law 
simply diminish in the face of domestic policy initiatives? 
 
A fourth factor which is inevitable is that departure leads to a rise of nationalism.168  Hesselink 
has noted the nationalist undertone in many technical arguments raised against the 
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Europeanisation of private law169 and ensuing national resistance against supranational law.170   
Likewise, it can be seen that the cutting of formal ties with the Privy Council encouraged 
jurisdictions to develop their “own” law which is particularly suited to localised needs.  In such 
an environment, however good the source may be, there may be a reluctance to be seen to 
“follow” the path of a previously supreme court when the onus should be on the domestic court 
to develop new law.  This is certainly the views of the most ardent Brexiteers. 
 
Predicting the course of Brexit is not for the unwary.  Nevertheless, for a comparative lawyer, 
faced with uncertainty, one’s first instinct is to find points of reference from systems which 
have faced similar dilemmas as a means for gaining a clearer picture of the possible responses 
to change.171  In highlighting factors which indicate when external case-law will be regarded 
as relevant and having persuasive force, we can gain a clearer idea of the factors likely to 
influence the operation of section 6.  This is not a question which can simply be answered by 
reading the 2018 Act.  If the interpretation of retained EU law is to benefit from the input of 
decisions of the CJEU and consideration of legislative reforms to the Directives on which the 
legislation is based, it is clear that much rests on the UK itself maintaining a dialogue and 
communication with European Union law.  This will not simply be a matter for UK judges, but 
one which should also concern UK academics and practising lawyers. 
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